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INTRODUCTION 
The frequency with which a particular event has been experienced 
has long been considered as a variable which influences human perception 
and memory. Despite this pervasive treatment of frequency as an 
independent variable, the manner in which frequency is perceived and 
remembered has remained remarkably ambiguous. In this light, much re-
search has treated frequency as the primary variable of investigation 
and has sought to explicate the representation of frequency in memory. 
Generally, frequency is thought of as some representation of the 
repetitiveness with which a particular event is noted and stored by an 
attending individual. Howell (1973), however, has pointed out that 
the nature of frequency repre~enlaliun lur Jiflere11t typt:s _./': _ ..... ~~ .. 1 .. -UI :OJ L I IIIli I U::> 
events (i.e., verbal vs. non-verbal stimuli) has not at all been 
made clear. 
If onlyverbal classes of stimuli are considered, the concept 
of frequency still has many different connotations. One traditional 
view of frequ.ency has referred to the usage of commonality of a word 
in the natural language. The Thorndike and Lorge (1944) and Kucera 
and Francis (1967) word counts have provided some means of assessing 
frequency in these terms. These investigations 1 i tera 11 y counted the 
number of times that English words occurred in large samples of printed 
material (i.e., books, magazines, and newspapers). It is presumed that 
word counts of this type provide information regarding an individual's 
familiarity with a particular word. In studies of verbal processes, 
this dimension of commonality or familiarity has typically been titled 
"background frequency." Numerous studies are avai luble which 
demonstrate that ''background frequency" influences behavioral tasks 
ranging from tachistoscopic \'/or-d identification (Solomon and Hm1es, 
(2) 
!951) to the long-ter-m recognition of VJOr-ds in a forced-choice situation 
(Gorman, 1961). 
A second use of the term frequency is made in reference to the 
occurrence of a verbal event rn a particular experimental context. 
This operational definition has been labelled "situational freque'lcy." 
Underwood (1969) has maintained that frequency in these terms is closely 
correlated with the degree to which an individual learns that a verbal 
event occurred in a given experimental setting; the more times that an 
item occurs, the greater the probability that it will be recalled. 
Additionally, Underwood (1972) has pointed to "situational frequency'• 
as a ~e-eminent variable mediating the recognition and discrimination 
of wor·ds in verbal learning tasks. It is the nature and operation 
of ••situational frequenc/ 1 that will be given careful consideration. 
(Hereafter, the use of the term frequency will be limited to the 
11situational 11 definition.) 
_T_he_ Nature _Of __ F_re_q~u_ency Representation 
The manner in which frequency information is represented in 
memory is a topic which has generated considerable recent interest. 
(cf. Howell, 1973). The oldest and probably simplest position regarding 
the representation of frequency is the 11 t race-s t rength 11 hypothesis. 
This point-of-view holds that frequency information is mediated by some 
internal process that grows progressively stronger with repeated 
occurrences of a verbal event. As Howell (1973) points out, any 
behavioral manifestation of frequency such as disc~imination or 
estimation is simply ''a matter of reading out cut-nmt strength values (3 ) 
(p.4S)." The 11 trilcc-strength" hypothesis, v1hile parsimonious, is plagued 
by several difficulties. For one, the operation of frequency is inextri-
cably tied to the formation of an overall memory trace for an event >vhich 
can undoubtedly be influenced by factors other than frequency. The mean-· 
ingfulness and concreteness of verbal items, for example, have also been 
linked to the degree of learning and hence to the strength of a memory 
trace. Also, because the operation of such a mechanism is presumed to 
be cumulative in nature, only a general strength value would be available 
at a given time and little or no information would be present regarding 
hovJ and when the repeated events had occurred. It is obvious, however, 
that individuals do possess information which allows fine discriminations 
to be made along temporal and modality dimensions. (Hintzman, 1969; 
Hintzman & Block, 1970, 1971; Hintzman and Haters, 1969, 1970) 
The research of Hintzman and his associates has prompted the 
formulation of an alternative view regarding frequency representation 
which has been ca 11 ed the "mu 1 tip 1 e-t race" hypothesis. According to 
Hintzman and Block (1971), the "multiple-trace" hypothesis states that 
the effect of frequency is to increase the number of traces which exist 
in memory. With each repeated occurrence, an additional trace is laid 
dovm alongside those which are already present. The various traces are 
differentiated by some sort of "tag" which Hintzman and Block have 
assumed to be primarily of a temporal nature. 
Support for the "multiple-trace" hypothesis has come from three 
experiments which demonstrate that individuals are sensitive to both 
temporal and frequency information and that frequency is dependent 
upon the temporal discriminability of repeated occurrences (Hintzman 
& Block, 1971). In the first experiment, evidence was presented 
indicating that individuals are fairly accurate in determining the 
spatial-ternporul position of a study I ist item. The subjects in this 
study were asked to judge in which lOth of a 50 item list a particular 
word had occurred. 
A second experiment was more critical in formulating the 
(4) 
·~ultiple-trace 11 hypothesis and sought to determine the extent to which 
two position judgments for a twice presented word could be made. The 
subjects were presented with a study list containing both once and twice 
occurring items. The twice presented words were of primary importance 
and each of these words occurred in two different sections of the list 
which were labelled A, B, C, and D. These 11zones 11 corresponded to 
ordinal positions 3-8, 9-14, 15-20, and 43-48 in a 50 word study list 
and were chosen on the basis of the first experiment which indicated 
that these were the areas of maximum discriminability. Different 
combinations regarding the positions of the two occurrences resulted in 
words which were labelled as AC, AD, BC, and BD items. 
Hintzman and Block expected that the judgment of the first 
occurrence of a word would be independent of the position of the second 
if independent memory traces with temporal 11 tags 11 are present in memory. 
Similar independence was, of course, anticipated for the second 
occurrence. The results of the experiment essentially confirmed the 
predictions. The first-position judgments for the AC and AD items did 
not differ significantly ftom one another and were consistently 
dissimilar to judgments made on the BC and BD items. Conversely, the 
second position judgments for AC and BC items were alike but differed 
from judgments made on the AD and BD items. 
The third study demonstrated that individuals are capable of 
distinguishing recent from remote 11situational 11 frequency. The 
subjects were presented with two 1 ists of words separated by a five 
minute interval. The two 1 ists were constructed such that 36 words 
rr
ed in both of the 1 ists. Four words were assigned to nine 
occu 
e~periment.ll conditions representing all combinations of three List 
( 5 ) 
frequencies and three List 2 frequencies (0, 2, and 5 repetitions). As 
the "multirle-trace" hypothesis would predict, the subjects in this 
experiment were quite good in judging the number of times which a 
given item had occurred in each of the two 1 ists. 
The "trace-strength'' and "multiple-trace" hypotheses do not 
exhaust the possibilities and other positions regarding frequency 
representation can be formulated by combining certain features of the 
"trace-strength" and "multiple-trace" vievJs. Underv.10od's position (1969, 
1972) regarding the nature of frequency can be cited as an example of a 
"multiple-process" hypothesis (cf. Howell, 1973). His position evolves 
from the conceptualization of memory for a verbal event as a collection 
of attributes or properties which can be encoded during the presentation 
of a given word. Both Underwood (1969) and Wickens (1970) have advocated 
that memory be viewed in these terms. In addition, Underwood has 
distinguished two major classes of attributes; one class serving to 
discriminate one memory from another, the second acting as retrieval 
mechanisms for accessing a target memory. The former class of attributes 
is represented by frequency, temporal, and modality information; all of 
which presumably provide dimensions along which differences among verbal 
events can be noted. These attributes, however, are not necessarily 
useful in the retrieval of the items. The latter class of attributes 
are associative in nature and do aid in the retrieval of verbal items 
from memory. Specific cues are established which allow otherwise 
unavailable items to be reproduced during a test of memory. For example, 
if a group of words all belong to a particular taxonomic category and 
Coded as such, memory for these items wi 11 be facilitated by are en 
k ·ng the category name as a retrieval cue at the time of recall. i nvo ' - -
( 6) 
The conceptualization of memory as a collection of attributes has 
frequency a double role in Underwood's views of memory. On the given 
one hand, Unden'lood has stated in his 1969 paper that "frequency is a 
maJor manipulable variable underlying learning; the greater the 
frequency the better the learning" and that further "frequency is 
normally associated with the strength of learning." (p. 563) This 
statement intuitively appears to mean that frequency (at least one) is 
necessary for any attribute to be encoded and that as frequency in-
creases, more attributes are likely to be encoded thereby enha11cing the 
memory for a given event. This is, of course, consistent with a 
"trace-strength" hypothesis. 
Alternatively, however, Underwood (1969, 1972) has maintained 
that frequency, itself, is encoded as an attribute of memory in much the 
same way as acoustic orthographic, and associative properties of words. 
This assertion is based on research which has attempted to break the 
almost inevitable correlation between "strength" and frequency. For 
example, Underwood (1969b) has demonstrated that while words presented 
only once in a long study list are recalled much better if they occur 
at either the beginning or the end of the list than if they occur in 
the middle, judgments regarding the number of occurrences for these 
same items do not differ as a result of list position. 
The studies of Hintzman and Block (1971) also make it necessary 
to consider frequency apart from the overall strength of a memory. 
Their results have shown that repeated occurrences of a verbal item 
can be idcntif~d fairly well along a temporal dimension and thus 
frequency and tempera 1 information are, of necessity, dependent upon 
a
nother to a large extent. Frequency, under the 11multiple-tr·ace 11 
one 
(7) 
is derived from the retrieval of temporally-marked traces at the 
vieW, 
. of a memory test. Undenvood, however, has preferred to consider 
trme 
frequency as an attribute distinct from temporal information and 
therefore his position is incompatible with the 11multiple-trace 11 
hypothesis. The reason is stated quite succinctly by Howell (1973). 
11ff an event memory is defined as the sum total of stored attributes, 
and one attribute is frequency, then there is no vehicle to convey 
multiple traces 11 because 11 frequency must be represented in order to 
define an event, but multiple event representations define frequency. 11 
(p. 45) 
Apart from the above considerations, there are a number of 
questions regarding the representation of frequency that are yet to be 
answered. It is probably safe to state that no one hypothesis can 
reconcile all of them and that some of these questions have not been 
reconciled by any of the existing hypotheses. For example, is the 
frequency encoded from a particular word with a number of different 
meanings (a homograph) specific to a given meaning or is it merely 
encoded via the generic representation of that word? Additionally, 
one wonders what constitutes a unit of frequency in different types of 
verbal materials if it is assumed that frequency serves as a general 
attribute of memory. Does frequency always accrue to an individual 
word even when it is presented in connected discourse or can frequency 
accrue to larger verbal units such as sentences? 
The functional unit of frequency information is, of course, a 
relevant consideration for either the 11multiple-trace11 hypothesis or a 
position which considers frequency to be an encoded attribute of memory 
(cf. Underwood, 1969) If frequency is dependent upon the retrieval of 
dent t 1-aces at the time of test, as the "mu It i pIe-trace" indcpen 
tl Js ·1 c i nm1 1 i es, the question can be raised as to whether the hypo 1e ·' 
(8) 
of sentence units as well as the frequency of the constituent frequency 
words can be derived following experience vJith stimulus material com-
. cd of meaninqful sentences. Demonstration of such an abi I ity would pr1s · 
indicate that the derivation of frequency involves something more than 
the temporal-tagging of individual words in order to make them discrimin-
able from one another. Other information regarding the properties of the 
sentences, themselves, (i.e. syntactic and semantic) would seem to be 
necessarily imp! icated. For example, an individual must be sensitive 
to changes in wording when various paraphrases of a sentence are 
presented for study, if he is to accurately assess the number of times 
that a particularly worded sentence has occurred. On the other hand, 
attention need not be given to wording if one is to judge the number of 
times that certain words have occurred regardless of the sentence in 
which they were included. Finally, an additional situation is confronted 
if one is asked to judge the frequency with which a particular idea 
or meaning has been expressed without regard to the manner in which it 
is stated. Again exact wording is not a relevant consideration but 
neither ~ the occurrence of individual words. In this case, the seman-
tic content of the sentence whould be considered as the relevant unit of 
frequency. A demonstrated ability for judging the frequency of both 
sentences and words included in sentences would imply that if an 
explanation of frequency as an encoded attribute is to be accepted, 
frequency would have to be noted and maintained in an independent fashion 
for both types of verbal events (i.e. sentences and words). 
It is suggested here that frequency is derived at the time of 
test as the "multiple-trace" hypothesis would contend, but that 
(9) 
ncy· estimates are mudc on the basis of whatever information is freque - -
relevant and necessary for the purticular type of frequency judgment 
that is being requested. A temporal 11 tag, 11 as Hintzman and Block have 
indicated, is, of course, one but not the only dimension that can 
function in judging the frequency of different types of verbal events. 
With these considerations in mind, attention will be turned to some of 
the experimental paradigms in which behavioral manifestations of 
frequency can be witnessed. 
Verbal Discriminatio~ Learning and Frequency Theory 
Underwood (1969) has maintained that frequency is the predominant 
attribute of memory involved in discrimination and recognition 
processes. Basic support for this position has come from experimental 
work conducted within the verbal discrimination (VD) learning paradigm. 
Generally, the VD paradigm involves the presentation of two items 
for study with one being arbitrarily denoted by the experimenter as 
correct. On a later test trial, the items are again presented to a sub-
ject and he is asked to indicate which of the two words had been 
previously labelled as correct. During the course of a VD experiment, 
study and test trials are typically alternated until some set criterion 
of learning is reached. 
In 1966, Ekstrand, \.Jallace, and Underwood proposed the 11 Frequency 
Theory 11 of verbal discrimination to account for performance in this 
paradigm. As the name implies, frequency is considered as the primary 
determinant of learning and several mechanisms and rules are laid out to 
explicate its operation. The theory describes four basic ways in which 
frequency is accumulated for the presented words. First, a pair of words 
is presented; a unit of frequency accrues to each simply through the act 
( 1 0) 
of perceiving the items. Ekstrand ct al. have r-eferred to this frequer1cy 
input as a ;'re1>resentational response" (RR). Additional units of 
however, may be added to the correct words by having the sub-frequency, 
ject pronounce the right items. The act of saying the correct item 
aloud (pronunciation response, PR) allows the correct items to accumulate 
number of frequency units than the incorrect items during the a greater 
course of study and test trials. Along tvith these overt mechanisms of 
accumulating frequency, the theory has also provided for two additional 
mechanisms which allow for covert accrual. It is assumed that during the 
course of VD learning, a subject will implicitly rehearse the correct 
and possibly the incorrect items. These "rehearsal responses" (RCR) also 
provide additional units of frequency. Finally, Ekstrand et al. (1966) 
also point out that the presentation of any word has the possibility of 
eliciting other words which one associates tvith the particular experi-
mental item. These "implicit associative responses"(JARs) may be other 
correct or incorrect words which are present in the VD 1 ist and these 
implicit responses are assumed to increment the frequency of the actual 
list items (cf. Underwood, 1965). 
Ekstrand et al. assume that performance in the VD task is 
mediated by a frequency differential which exists between members of a 
given pair. The manner in which this frequency information is stored is 
not clearlydefined but the theory implies that some type of counter-
mechanism tallies up the frequency units contributed through the different 
processes and produces a sum total for each word. The counter-mechanism 
seems to suggest that a strength-notion of storage is involved since both 
overt and covert presentations of a word contribute to the same 
frequency total and the theory provides no means by which the different 
types of responses can be distinguished from one another. I 
I' 
i 
I j 
( I I ) 
The frequency theory was originally developed in order to 
ret the results of a verbal discrimination study conducted by jnterp 
d je ~sc and Ekstrand (1964), but was subsequently extended UnderviOO , - ' 
to other VD situations. (cf. Ekstrand et al., 1966) In the Underwood 
et al. experiment, the subjects were given an initial VD list and then 
transferred to a second 1 ist which was varied among the different 
groups. In one condition (R), the correct member of each pair in the 
first list was retained as the correct item in the second list while a 
new word vJas pr·esented as the other member of the pair. In a second 
condition (W), the incorrect item from a pair in the first list was 
placed h the second list with a new word becoming the correct member. 
A control condition was also included in which the two lists were 
unrelated. 
The performance on the second 1 ist showed essentially 100% transfer 
for subjects in condition (R), suggesting that frequency units can be 
transferred betvJeen lists. Transfer performance in condition (W), how-
ever, was quite different. Initially, the subjects performed quite well 
and \'<'ere superior to the control group. As trials progressed, however, 
the subjects improved very little and eventually fell below the per-
formance of the control group. Ekstrand et al. (1966) in their later 
interpretation of this finding, maintained that the new words which w~re 
correct in the second 1 ist rapidly gained frequency and soon achieved 
the frequency level held by the old words. As a result, the frequency 
discrimination broke down. 
These results of the Underwood et al. (196lf) experiment have 
been explained in frequency theory terms by the postulation of two rules 
which a subject may use in order to make a correct discrimination. 
Rule 1 states that the word with the highest level of frequency is chosen 
t ~18 cor·rcc t as ' - i tcm. 
(I 2) 
EkstrGnd et al. bel ievcd that this WQS the rule 
d by the subjects in Condition R of the Undcr·wood et al. (1964) employe 
study. Rule 2 states thQt the word with the lower frequency is chosen 
h correct item. Presumably, this strategy v1as used by subjects as t e 
in Condition\~ at the outset of the tr·ansfer list, but this rule be-
came inappropriate as the frequency of the new items increased and thus 
the subjects were forced to switch to the Rule 1 strategy later in the 
transfer list. The breakdown of the frequency differential has been 
interpreted as the cause of the poor performance in the group with "old" 
items retained as incorrect. These results have been taken as strong 
support for frequency theory although a total breakdown to a chance 
level was not observed. 
Ekstrand et al. (1966) demonstrated that this same rationale 
could be used to explain the manner in which a single VD list is 
learned. Their experiment involved repeating the presentation of correct 
or incorrect items in different pairs during the presentation of the 
same study list. It was found that presenting a correct item in two 
pairs facilitated overall VD performance. It is assumed that additional 
frequency units accrue to the repeated items thereby magnifying the 
frequency between the repeated items and their incorrect counterparts. 
Alternatively, presenting the same incorrect item in different pairs 
deterred VD performance. It is assumed here that the additional units 
added to the repeated incorrect items eliminated the advantage gained 
by the correct items through normal study-test procedures. A final 
condition VJas included in which the repeated item served as the correct 
Word in one pair but as the incorrect item in another. Under this 
arrangement, VD learning proceeded with great difficulty since in one 
pair containing a repeated item, the correct word has a higher level of 
~ · 1 in another pair the incorrect item had a higher frequencY' VIIi I e 
(I 3) 
frequencY I eve l. This necessitated that Ru 1 c 1 (se 1 ect the vJOrd with 
h "gl1.,st frequency) and Rule 2 (select the word with the lower fre-the 1 ~ . 
) bo th be used in the same 1 is t; 'a task that subjects apparent 1 y quency 
could not do efficiently. 
The Ekstrand et al. study also documented the operation of lARs 
in VD learning. This V·Jas accomplished by including a particular word 
and a high associate of that word in different pairs within the same 
study list. By manipulating the position of the given item and its high 
associate in conditions similar to those described above for repeated 
items, it was found that lARs do operate in the accrual of frequency 
units. 
Additional supporting evidence for frequency theory has been 
provided by research that has fami 1 i ar i zed subjects with words 1 ater 
included in a VD 1 ist. Unden"..ood and Freund (1968) 1 for example, built 
up the frequency of either correct or incorrect VD items through prior 
free-recall learning trials. Their results indicated that frequency 
transferred from free-recall trials to VD learning in basically the same 
manner that frequency transferred from one VD 1 i st to another (cf. Under-
wood et a 1 . , 1961~) 
Other research has indicated that perceived differences in 
situational frequency which mediate VD performance are dependent upon 
the initial or base level of frequency. Underwood and Freund (1970) 
found that verbal discrimination becomes quite inaccurate when the 
familiarization frequency of words later included in VD pairs is built 
up to a high 1 eve 1 but the in it i a 1 differences between the correct and 
incorrect items in the subsequent VD learning are slight. For example, an 
initial difference in frequency between correct and incorrect items was 
( Jll) 
discri1ninable if the familiarization inputs \"iere respectively 
rnuch more 
1 as opr,osed to 7 vs. 5. Appa1·ently, frequency operates under 3 vs. 
I · to the psychoph"sical lav1 of v/eber which states that as t hing a (In - ' 5ome · 
the 
intensity of tlt!o stimuli is incl-eased, the difference necessary to 
. ·,minatc the two must also be of a greater magnitude. d 1scr 
A studyconducted by King and Levin (1971) shows results which 
are Somewhat anomalous regarding frequency theory predictions. In 
this experiment, the subjects were transferred from one VD 1 ist to 
another in much the same manner as the Underwood et al. (1964) investi-
gation. One group of subjects received a second list which retained the 
wrong items from List l as the incorrect words (Condition W-W), while a 
second group was confronted with a second list in which the correct 
items from List l became incorrect (Condition R-\~). In addition, the 
subjects were given varying numbers of trials (2, 4, and 8) during List 
learning. 
As would be expected from frequency theory, the initial trials 
on the second 1 ist showed superior performance for the two experimental 
groups VJhen they were compared to a control group which learned unre-
lated lists. Also, the effect of varying List 1 trials was more 
pronounced in the R-W condition than in the W-W condition because of the 
greater frequencybuild-up for List l right items. However, the 
deterioration in performance over trials did not materialize as would be 
anticipated from frequency theory predictions. This was especially 
true in the case of eight List l learning trials. 
The failure of King and Levin (1971) as well as the failure of 
Underwood et al. (1964) to obtain the predicted transfer effects for 
wrong items in a prior list can perhaps be explained by some suggestions 
made by Hintzman and Block (1971). As indicated earlier, they were 
("15) 
l · demonstrating that subjects are capable of discr-iminating success fu 'n 
from rcrnote frequencies. 
recent 
They have argued that deterioration to 
h n ee level would not be expected because in later Test 2 trials a a c a' 
subject 1•10uld be capable of ignoring frequency gained during List l and 
discriminating \tlith only recent List 2 frequency. 
A recent study by Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) has lent some 
experimental validity to this explanation. These investigators employed 
a VD transfer task in which the designation of correct and incorrect 
items learned in List l was reversed for the second list. It was found 
that a temporal separation between the two lists reduced the extent to 
which transfer performance deteriorated only VJhen a relatively low 
degree of List l learning (If trials) was given. Under conditions of 
high List learning (8 trials), a temporal separation did not aid the 
subjects in distinguishing recent from remote frequencies and slight 
deterioration effects were found regardless of whether a temporal 
separation was provided. 
Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) have argued that the differential 
results produced by varying the number of List l trials may be due to 
a confounding of the degree of List l learning and the temporal separa-
tion between the initial trials of the original and transfer lists. 
The frequencyaccumulated in early trials of original learning,is of 
necessity, more temporally removed when 8 as opposed to 4 List l trials 
are given simply because more presentation time is required. Perhaps 
this prolonged separation between the start of List l and List 2 learn-
ing in the case of 8 original learning trials allows the discrimination 
of recent and remote frequencies to be made without the addition of a 
temporal separation between the two 1 ists. 
Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) have also attempted to account for the 
• • of King and Levin (1971) to obtain a deterioration in transfer 
fa• 1 urc-
nce follov1ing 8 List I learning trials. It v-1as reasoned that 
performa - · 
·nq List 1 uials l ikev;ise increases an individual's information 
lncreas I - . 
regarding List 1 context (i.e. the particular '-'vOI-ds included in the 
( 16) 
· ) If contextual information can aid in the discrimination of 
study I Is t . 
a nd remote frequencies, the failure of King and Levin (1971) to recent 
obtain a deterioration in transfer performance may have been due to the 
fact that the transferred items (either correct or incorrect) were 
paired 1,vith new items, thus substantially changing the context of the 
two lists. Remote from recent frequencies could then have been very 
efficiently discriminated on the basis of the contextual distinction. In 
the Pasko and Zechmeister (1973) study, however, the context of the two 
lists was not substantially changed because the same items were merely 
reversed in their designation of correct or incorrect. With no relevant 
·contextual information for distinguishing List l and List 2 frequencies, 
the subjects were forced to rely on a temporal discrimination as 
Hintzman and Block have suggested and in accord with earlier studies 
(cf. Underwood et al.), a certain amount of deterioration in transfer 
performance was displayed. 
Other research which has investigated the role of lARs in VD 
learning has also not wholly supported the expectations of frequency 
theory. A number of experiments have included transfer tasks that were 
designed in such a way that List l items were expected to elicit lARs 
which would be \vords subsequently included in the second list. (Kausler 
and Dean 
' 
1967; Raskin, Boise, Rubel, and Clark, 1968; Cole and Kanak, 
1972) In all of these studies, the predicted transfer effects were 
'found only h I wen t1e subjects were instructed in the relationships 
between the two lists. Although Ekstrand et al. (1966) have found that 
( l 7) 
arently do increment frequency in the learning of a single VD lARs app 
Jist, the incrementation of frequency through the production of lARs 
Ot appear to readily transfer across lists unless individuals are does n 
given a specific set to do so. 
n ·1 t ·1 on /·iemory and Frequency _l_n_f_o_r_m._a_t_i o_n_ Recog ---- -- -------
-
In many respects, a recognition memory task can be likened to 
verbal discrimination learning. In a typical forced-choice recognition 
task, a list of study words is presented to a subject who is later asked 
to identify these 110ld 11 words when they are intermingled among distractor 
or llnew11 items. According to the frequency theory, the study list 
presentation allows at least one unit of situational frequency to accrue 
to the study words. Therefore, the theory assumes, a recognition 
decision can be made on the basis of a 1 vs. 0 frequency differential at 
time of test. This situation is, of course. not unlike the strategies 
which are purportedly used by subjects in a VD task. 
If both recognition and discrimination are governed by frequency 
information, subjects who are required to make either frequency judgments 
or recognition decisions should show simi Jar performance when the input 
conditions are identical. Underwood (1972) has shown that such does 
appear to be the case. In this experiment, two groups of subjects 
viewed identical study lists containing once and twice presented words, 
and were later tested with a multiple-choice recognition task. The 
groups, however, differed in terms of the experimental instructions. 
One group was told before presentation of the study list that they 
would later have to choose the most frequently presented word when the 
words appeared in a multiple-choice set. The second group was instructed 
that they were to learn the study list '01ords in order to correctly 
recognize them in the multiple-choice test. The results did, in fact, 
( 18) 
indicate that errors resulting from frequency judgments and recognition 
decisions for both once and twice presented words were of the same order 
of magnitude. 
Frequency theory predictions regarding recognition memory have 
also been investigated by building up the frequency of distractor items 
during the testing phase of an experiment. (Underwood & Freund, 1970a) 
In a series of experiments, new (or wrong) items were repeatedly paired 
1
.,rith several different right items during the recognition test. It was 
expected that the recognition of the old items would become progressively 
more difficult as the number of previous experiences with the distractor 
items during the recognition test became larger. In general, these 
studies confirmed the view that as the frequency of the wrong item 
increases, recognition decisions should become progressively more 
d iff i cu 1 t. 
The role of lARs in recognition memory has also been of consider-
able importance in extending frequency theory to the recognition paradigm. 
The theory stated by Ekstrand et al. (1966) maintains that the 
situational frequency of a word can be incremented through the word 1 s 
occurrence as an IAR. This assumption should lead to differential results ! [ 
in recognition memory depending upon the associative relationships 
among o 1 d and new i terns. 
Underwood (1965) demonstrated that in a continuous recognition 
paradigm, the probability of falsely identifying a word as 11old 11 was I 
I :i 
significantly higher if it was preceded in the list by a word which was 
likely to elicit it as an IAR. In a similar manner, Underwood and Freund 
(1968b) have found that recognition memory suffers when the distractor 
items are especiully designed as possible lARs of the study list words. 
Both of these experiments have been interpreted as strong support for 
( 19) 
the pre-dominance of the frequency attribute in recognition memory. 
The production of lARs has been somewhat indirectly demonstrated 
as a variable affecting forced-choice recognition in a study conducted 
by Unden·mod and F1·eund (1970b). Previous research (Gorman, 1961) had 
indicated that background frequency as determined by the Thorndike and 
Lorge count influences recognition memory. In particular, the recogni-
tion of words is poorer when high-frequency words are used as study and 
distractor items than when all low-frequency words are used. It was 
believed that these findings could at least be partially explained by 
frequency theory predictions regarding the role of lARs. Underwood and 
Fruend maintained that during the presentation of a study list, lARs will 
naturally be produced and that a greater number will be elicited when the 
study words have a high background frequency. These lARs can produce two 
different effects. First, they can increment the situational frequency 
of another study word which would facilitate recognition performance, but 
alternatively, they could increment the frequency of a distractor item 
which would produce a deleterious effect. 
Word association norms show that 1 ovJ-f requency words typ i ca 11 y 
elicit associations that are higher frequency words. Therefore, the 
role of lARs should be neg] igible under conditions where all low-
frequency words are used as study and distractor items. Recognition 
decisions could then proceed, as frequency theory would predict, on the 
basis of the situational frequency accrued to the study items during the 
study list presentations. 
The case in which all high-frequency words are used is consider-
ably different. f\t first glance, it would seem that the opposing 
effects of lARs would cancel one another and recognition could be 
carried out in the predicted manner. Underwood and freund (1970), 
(20) 
however, made a cruci~l assumption in order to explain the poorer 
performance with high-frequency words. In their own words, "adding an 
additional unit of frequency to an old word produces a relatively small 
increase in discriminability ... thcrefore, the negative effect should be 
greater than the positive effect when high-frequency words are presented 
for study and nci•J words are also high frequency words." (p. 345) 
In order to provide a theoretical accounting of the role of 
lARs in the recognition of words of varying background frequency, an 
experiment was conducted in which high and low frequency words were 
used in all possible combinations of study and distractor words. It 
was predicted that the best recognition performance would be found in 
the condition where high-frequency words were used as study items with 
low-frequency 1vords serving as distractors (Condition HF-LF). Under this 
arrangement, only a facilitating effect due to lARs would be present. 
Likewise, it was expected that condition HF-HF would show the poorest 
performance while the other two conditions (LF-HF and LF-LF) would be 
i nte nned i ate. 
The results of the experiment clearly bore out the predicted 
effects. Underwood and Freund were also careful to point out that the 
superior performance in condition HF-LF could not have resulted from 
the subjects use of background frequency information (i.e. picking the 
high-frequency word in a multiple-choice pair). If such had been the 
case, conditions HF-LF and LF-HF should not have differed significantly, 
for h condition LF-HF, the subjects simply could have reversed this 
strategy. 
While considerable evidence seems to weigh favorably towards the 
view that frequency is the predominant attribute in recognition, it 
should be ncted that a frequency discrimination is, of course, not the 
(2 I ) 
only manner in vJhich a recognition decision can be made. Two recent 
investigations (Hall and Pierce, 1972; Zechmcister and Gude, 1973), 
in particular; have shown that the production of lARs may operate in 
a fashion somevvhat different from what frequency theory would predict. 
In these experiments, the subjects were asked to study a long 1 ist of 
high-frequency words for a subsequent recognition test. In some condi-
tions, the subjects were encouraged to produce lARs while in others, 
the subjects \vere simply told to repeat the word over and over to 
themselves. 
Considering the nature of the study lists, it would seem that the 
IAR-producing group ~ould be handicapped in recognition performance for 
the distractoJ- items were also high-frequency words. (cf. Underwood 
and Freund, 1970) Both studies, however, found that the IAR group was 
superior to repetition and control subjects. It was suggested by 
Zechmeister and Gude (1973) that the act of making an association, 
itself, may serve as a discriminative cue with which a recognition 
decision could be made. By this, it is meant that the subject actually 
remembers that he produced an IAR to a particular study word and this 
retention bolsters a discrimination. 
Frequency Judgments and Tempora 1 Information 
Research which has been identified with the multiple-trace 
hypothesis has linked the frequency attribute quite closely to temporal 
information. To restate the hypothesis, frequency serves to increase 
the number of independent traces for a particular event which exist 
in memory. These traces are temporally marked and by retrieving the 
various traces, an individual is capable of giving some accounting of 
the number of times that an event has occurred. 
Hintzman and Waters (1969) provided evidence that the occurrence i, ' ' 
of u word in a particulnr list of items is tagged with temporal (22) 
information. In this study, the subjects were presented with two sue-
cessive lists which were either separated in time by a 15 minute interval 
or 1.,rere presented 1.,rith no appreciable interval between the two. Upon 
completion of the study list presentations, the subjects, at varying 
int2rvals, were again exposed to study items and asked to place them in 
one of the two lists. Basically, it was discover-ed that as the interval 
between study and test increased, this task became progressively more 
difficult in both conditions. However, when the discrimination judgments 
took place during the same experimental session, Hintzman and Waters 
found that the subjects were more adept at determining the list to which 
a particular item belonged in the situation where a 15 minute interval 
had been pI aced betv1een the two 1 is ts. 
In another investigation, Zimmerman and Underwood (1968) rather 
strikingly demonstrated the amount of temporal information which a 
subject possesses following the presentation of study items. During 
the course of this experiment, the subjects were consecutively presented 
with 12 short lists containing 8 to 12 items. Following each list, a 
recall period ensued in which the subjects were asked to reproduce only 
the items in the preceding set. Two additional tasks were administered 
after all of the lists had been presented. First, the subjects were 
given 12 cards, each with one of the study lists printed on it, and were 
told to arrange the cards in the sequence which the 12 study 1 ists had 
followed. In a second task, the subjects were given two items from each 
list and asked to judge the ordinal relationship of these items in their 
respective lists. 
The critical manipulation in this experiment was embodied in 
instructions which were given to the subjects prior to the presentation 
(2 3) 
of any of the study lists. These instructions differed in the extent to 
which they informed the subjects to attend to temporal or ordinal inform-
ation. One group was given normi'll free-recall instructions with no 
mention being made that temporal information would later be tested. 
Tv1o other groups were respectively told that word position or word 
position and list position would be tested. 
Zimmerman and Underwood (1968) found that there were essentially 
no differences among the three instruction groups regarding performance 
in either the word or list position tasks although accuracy in all 
groups was substantial on both measures. It seems clear from this 
study that spatial-temporal information is naturally acquired without 
specific instructions to do so and that there is no obvious expense to 
an individual'sability to recall. 
As has already been mentioned, Hintzman and Block (1971) care-
fully laid out the multiple-trace hypothesis and in so doing made a 
crucial connection between a frequency attribute and temporal information 
such as that described in the Hintzman and Waters (1969) and Zimmerman 
and Underwood (1968) studies. Frequency under the multiple-trace 
hypothesis is not perceived or encoded directly but is rather inferred 
from the number of temporally discriminable traces which can be 
retrieved for a particular repeated occurrence. 
If freq.Jency judgments are, in fact, determined by temporally 
distinguished traces, increasing the temporal discriminability of repeated 
occurrences should facilitate a subject's ability to make accurate 
judgments of frequency. One variable which should influence temporal 
discrimination is the spacing of item repetitions. Melton (1970) has 
pointed out that spacing the repetitions of items in a free-recall task 
enhances the overall number of recalled words as compared to a situation 
1111 
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(24) 
vJhcre the reretitions occur in a successive manner. Further, Melton 
(1367) .:md t1adigan (1969) have found that as the number of items inter-
vening between repetitions increases so too does the performance in I 
free- reca 11 increase. 
If the spacing val-iable influences the retrieval and recall of 
v10 rds in free-recall, it seems reasonable to expect that spacing would 
similarily facilitate the retrieval of the time-tagged traces which 
Hintzman and Block (1971) imply as the basis of frequency information. 
Tvm studies indicate that this does appear to be the case. Hintzman 
(1969) found that as the spacing of repetitions was increased, the 
subjects' estimated frequency more closely approximated the actual 
frequency with which the words in a study 1 ist had occurred. A later 
study by Hintzman and Block (1970) essentially confirmed these results. 
Apparent or perceived frequency does increase with the spacing of 
repetitions thus bolstering the position that frequency is dependent 
upon temporal information. 
Summary and Some Remaining Questions 
The frequency-counter notion of Underwood receives some support 
from verbal discrimination and recognition performance. However, 
certain failures of frequency theory, particularly, in regards to the 
transfer of frequency units across lists force its proponents to rely on 
discrepencies between apparent and actual frequency as explanations for 
the anomalous data. The multiple-trace hypothesis, on the other hand, 
is amenable to the findings of most research involved with the nature 
of frequency information. But according to Hintzman and Block (1971), 
frequency does not appear to be frequency at all but rather an extension 
of temporal discriminations. 
In any case, a number of questions raised at the outset of this 
(25) 
popcr hilve not been adequately assessed. Namely, what exactly 
constitutes a unit of frequency and if frequency is derived at the time 
of test, what type of information is used to infer the frequency with 
1,1hich different types of verbal events h<lVC occurred? /\]though these 
questions are closely related, an attempt v1ill be made to separately 
give each a more detailed consideration. 
\tJhat .!2 ~ Frequency Unit? 
In nearlyall of the studies which have been considered, the 
stimulus material has been individual words. In these experiments, 
therefore, an isolated word is assumed to be the unit of investigation. 
It should be remembered, however, that individuals do not typically 
encounter isolated words much less attempt to remember them. Words 
serve as constituent parts of larger language units and therefore 
are undoubtedly influenced by the context in which they occur. 
Regarding the encoding and representation of frequency, the 
question has already been raised as to whether a word is generically 
encoded (i.e. in terms of its orthographic properties) or is considered 
in terms of its specific semantic properties. In studies where only 
isolated words are presented for study, this consideration becomes 
relatively unmportant because there is no reason to assume that different 
semantic encodings will occur each time that an item is repeated. 
However, when a word can be biased to a number of different meanings 
depending upon its context, the question is one of utmost importance if 
the manner in which words are encoded is to be understood. 
Several investigations have recently provided some understanding 
of the effects of context on memory for words. Bobrow (1970) investi-
gated the reca 1 I of words contained in sentences. It was hypothesized 
that if word meanings are remembered then repeating nouns in paraphrased 
(26) 
sentences which preserved the original meaning of the nouns would result 
: n higher reca 11 than repct it ions of the nouns in sentences which 
changed the meanings of the words. To test this hypothesis, Bobrow used 
homographs as the critical nouns and included same meaning (SM), 
different meaning (DM), and exact repetition (E) conditions. At the 
time of test, the subject-noun was presented to a subject and recall of 
the object~oun was requested. The proportion of object-nouns recalled 
in the S~1 and E conditions was not significantly different but both 
were evidently superior to the condition in which different meaning 
repetitions were presented. 
Thios (1972) has expanded on these initial findings of Bobrow. 
In addition to varying the context in which critical nouns \-Jere repeated 
(SM,DM, and E conditions), the repetitions were also varied according 
to the number of intervening sentences. This manipulation of the 
spacing of repetitions warrants some explanation. Madigan (1969) has 
suggested that the effect of spacing is to enhance the retrievability 
of repeated items by providing additional retrieval cues associated with 
the different lists contexts in which the repetitions occur. By 
presenting items in widely disparate portions of a study list, Madigan 
maintained that variable encodings of the word would result because the 
items would be experienced in the presence of a different set of list 
members and would likely enter into rehearsal strings made up of 
different studyitems. In addition, Madigan (1969) found that the 
spacing effect was eliminated if another cue-word presented along vJith 
the to-be-remembered item was changed at each repetition. Apparently, 
providing the subjects with these additional retrieval cues at recall 
attenuated the facilitative effect of spacing. Even with these single-
word cues, the context of encoding was already suitably different 
1
:11 
according to Madigan's interpretation. Thios (1972) anticipated that 
(2 7) 
semantic context of a sentence would serve simi lari ly if not more 
efficiently than a single word as a retrieval cue for the nouns contained 
in sentences. 
In this experiment, the spacing effect was eliminated v;hen the 
retrieval cues were changed (i.e. D~1 repetitions). Hov1ever, the recall 
of nouns from the DM sentences showed the poorest overall performance. 
Aithough the DM condition showed a slight advantage over theE condition 
at very short lags, theE condition became progressively better as the 
number of intervening sentences increased while the DM condition showed 
no significantchanges. The SM condition also displayed a spacing 
effect and was superior to the other two conditions across all spacing 
lags. Apparently, maintaining a certain amount of similarity in context 
is crucial for the recall of words whe11 they are presented in the body 
of a sentence. If such were not the case, the DM condition should have 
shown performance more equivalent to the SM condition in, at least, the 
short lag sitLations. 
Other experiments in which the recall of homographs has been 
investigated under varying conditions of spacing have produced some-
what different results. In these studies, however, the meaning of the 
homographs has been biased by simply presenting a single adjective 
relevant to one of the various meanings. Gartman and Johnson (1972), 
I 
I' ~ I 
I 
for example, found that the spacings effect was attenuated by changing 
cues but that overall recall was higher when the context cues were varied 
than when they were the same. (i.e. the homographs were biased to 
different meanings) This finding is, of course, contrary to the results 
reported by Thies (1972). 
It is possible, however, that i11cluding vJords in sentences as 
(28) 
Thies did, causes subjects to pay more attention to the meaning of the 
sentence as a whole rather than keying in on the occurrences of particular 
words as might be the case in the Gartman and Johnson exrcriment. Attend-
ing to the meaning of a \vhole sentence may effectively mask-out the second 
occurrence of critical words especially when they are embodied in a sen-
tence expressing a totally new idea. This would not be the case vJhere 
only tvJo words are presented and the subjects may make special note that 
the same stimulus word was present but that the .cue word was changed. 
Each of these studies in which recall was investigated, neverthe-
less, support the conclusion that words are not encoded generically. A 
recent study in which frequency judgments and recognition of homographs 
was investigated is more pertinent to our primary concern with frequency 
information. Rowe (1973) presented homographic words at frequency levels 
ranging from 1 to 5 while orthogonally varying the nature of contextual 
information. The repetitions of the homographs were carried out in four 
different ways. In one condition, the homographs were repeated in phrases 
that were intended to bias the same semantic encoding (St·l), wh i 1 e in a 
second condition, the repeated phrases were intended to evoke different 
semantic encodings (OM). Two control conditions were included in which 
the homographs were either repeated in an isolated fashion (RW) or were 
repeated in identical phrases (RP). All subjects were subsequently 
asked to judge the frequency with which a particular homograph had 
occurred. 
Rowe clearly found evidence that frequency input is influenced by 
semantic context. As would be expected, the various groups did not differ 
in their judgments when the presented frequency was only one and all of 
the conditions showed an increase in perceived frequency as the actual 
presented frequency became progressively larger. The increase in 
(29) 
perceived frequenc~ however, was not identical across the treatment 
conditions. The best estimates of frequency were made in condition RW 
vJhere the homographs vJere repeated in an isoluted fashion. In the 
conditions 1·1here the homographs were embedded in the context of a ph rase, 
frequency ~dgments suffered as the context of the homographs became 
Jess similar during the successive repetitions of the phrases. The 
exact phrase repetitions were most conducive to the judgment of 
frequency while the SM repetitions showed a significant advantage over 
the DM repetitions. Rowe 1 s findings undoubtedly allow the conclusion 
that frequency input is specific to the semantic encoding of a word. 
While it appears evident that the perceived frequency of words is 
influenced by semantic context, all of these studies varying the semantic 
encoding of homographs have still implicitly assumed that an individual 
word is the basic unit of frequency. Semantic context does p reduce 
differential results in recall depending upon whether a homograph is 
presented with a single word cue or embedded In the context of a meaning-
ful sentence. Likewise, frequency judgments are differentially affected 
depending upon whether the judged words are presented alone or in a 
phrase context. In reca 11, it has been suggested that the d i screpent 
findings are the result of different word processing strategies in the 
two experimental situations. In particular, sentences may be vie1.ved as 
intact units expressing a unitary idea rather than as a mere composite 
of individual words that are noted and stored independently. For 
frequency ~dgments, it is reasonable to suggest that under conditions 
v1here intact sentences are presented for study, it is the sentence, 
itself, and not the individual word which is the unit of frequency. 
Information about specific words may be merely incidental in such a task. 
There appears to be only one study in which frequency judgments on 
li 
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sentences have been attempted. 
(30) 
Jacoby (1972) presented his subjects with a series of sentences 
and 1 ater required frequency judgments on either intact sentences or the 
subject-nouns found in the sentences. During study, the sentences were 
repeated under varying conditions; some of the sentences were repeated 
with the subject-noun intact but with a different synonomous adjective 
and verb in each repetition, others were repeated with intact subject-
nouns but completely different modifiers (i.e. adjective and verb), and 
a final condition contained exact repetitions of the original sentences. 
In addition, the number of items intervening between the repetitions 
(0, 3, and 11) and the frequency of presentation were orthogonally 
combined \AJ i th the types of repetition. 
One general finding of Jacoby 1 s is particularly relevant to the 
suggestion made above that a sentence as a whole may be the relevant unit 
of frequency. In the case of exact repetitions, the frequency judgments 
of sentences were more accurate than those of the subject-nouns. This 
result im~ ies that the sentence is, indeed, the relevant unit for 
frequency estimation when meaningful sentences are presented for study. 
If such were not the case, there wou 1 d be no reason to expect the 
frequency of the whole sentences and the subject-nouns to differ in the 
exact repetition condition for their actual frequencies of presentation 
were identical. 
Looking specifically at the sentence judgments, Jacoby found 
that the subjects were quite efficient in detecting slight modifications 
in the \"Jord i ng of the sentences and thus avoiding confusions with 
sentences containing synonomous modifiers. The fact that frequency 
judgments were 1 ittle affected by the similarily worded versions is 
indicative of this basic result. In the same vein, the sentences which 
were followed by similar repetitions were not judged differently from 
the sentences with completely different repetitions. Apparently, the 
slightest change in wording made it possible to discriminate the 
original sentences from their modified repetitions. 
These results are somev-1hat surprising in light of a number of 
investigations which have assessed memory for sentences in both recall 
( 31 ) 
and recognition paradigms. Sachs (1967) and Begg (1971) have respect-
ively shown that primarily semantic rather than syntactic information 
is retained in long-term recognition and recall. These studies point 
out that it is the general meaning as opposed to the specific wording 
which is remembered. However, another study by Bregman and Strasberg 
(1971) has indicated that this generalization does not necessarily hold 
in all situations. These latter authors have demonstrated that subjects, 
when pressed to do so, are capable of remembering specific wording 
information. The subjects in Jacoby 1 s experiment were, of course, presseJ 
for this type of information and the simple constant structure of the 
experimental sentences may have made wording information relatively easy 
to remember. It will be of interest to discover whether or not 
frequency information regarding the occurrence of similar sentences 
expressing the same semantic content is also present in memory. 
How Is Frequency Derived? 
Jacoby (1972) has maintained that frequency of presentation is 
derived at the time of test rather than encoded as an attribute of 
memory during study. This position is, of course, consistent with the 
multiple-trace hypothesis. Hintzman and Block (1971) have considered a 
temporal 11 tag 11 discriminating the repeated occurrences of an item as the 
principal means by which frequency information is retrieved. Other 
researchers who have adopted the multiple-trace hypothesis have presented 
a somev1hat different vievJ regarding the identificCJtion of the 
( 32) 
differentiating tags. And0rson and Bower (1972), for example, have 
postulated the existence of 11 list markers 11 which link an event 1 s 
occurrence to a set of contextual elements. These 1 ist markers are 
presumed to bring into play information of a temporal sort, as well as 
information pertinent to other events which have immediately preceded and 
followed the event in question, and to subjective feelings of an individual 
(i.e. boredom) which might have been experienced at the time which a 
particular event occurred. Rowe (1973) has also supported the derived 
view of frequency and has suggested that his research with homographs 
marks the semantic encoding of an item as a possible dimension along 
\"lhich frequency information can be derived. 
Jacoby (1972) has, in some respects, shown that when the stimulus 
materials are identical, frequency judgments of different types 
(in his experiment, sentence vs. noun judgments) will be made and 
influenced along those dimensions of the stimulus material which are 
relevant to the type of judgment being requested. Considering the 
judgments of sentence frequency, the spacing of repetitions (i.e. a 
temporal attribute) was a facilitating variable in estimating frequency 
of occur renee for on 1 y those sentences which had i dent i ca 1 repetitions. 
(Jacoby, 1972) In this situation where repetitions are exact, a temporal 
tag such as that proposed by Hintzman and Block (1971) appears to be an 
efficient manner in which to derive frequency. Hith the similar and 
different modifier repetitions, however, it has already been pointed out 
that any change in wording was sufficient to discriminate the repeated 
occurrences of the sentences and thus the spacing variable is not 
operative. 
On the other hand, the frequency judgments for nouns were 
'I' ~ 
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influenced by spacing regardless of the type of modifiers. While the 
subjects were not completely accurate in their frequency judgments, 
they were, nevertheless, sensitive to the repetitions of nouns in 
differently worded sentences but at the same time were capable of 
detecting the dissimilarity of the sentences. As Jacoby has pointed 
out, to consider frequency as an encoded attribute v/ould necessitate 
that an index be maintained for the occurrence of particularly worded 
sentences as v1ell as an index for a particular word regardless of its 
sentence context. The preferred interpretation was, of course, that 
the abi 1 i ty to judge the frequency of both sentences and words viewed 
in the same stimulus material is largely a matter of deriving the 
information at the time of test on the basis of task instructions and 
the retrieval of cues which allov.J the judgments to be carried out in 
the mast efficient manner. 
I 
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THE PRESENT EXPERIMENT 
Recent research has provided a number of insights concerning the 
representation of frequency in memory. For example, Howe (1973) has 
shovm that the perceived frequency of a homograph is influenced by the 
manner in which semantic context biases encoding of meaning. Jacoby 
(1972) has also demonstrated that the frequency judgments of nouns are 
influenced by the type of sentences in which nouns are included. 
Additionally, Jacoby (1972) has found that the frequency of entire sen-
tences can be somewhat adequate 1 y assessed. Perhaps, it is more 
reasonable to ask the question 11what can be a frequency unit'' rather 
than the question 11what is a frequency unit. 11 
While Jacoby (1972) has presented evidence indicating that the 
repetitiveness of a sentence can be accurately judged, it is not 
possible to conclude that these judgments were made on the basis of the 
semantic content of the sentence as a who 1 e. The fact that sentences 
followed bysynonomous repetitions wer-e judged no higher than sentences 
followed by completely different repetitions (i.e. the noun was the 
same but the modifiers had different meanings) indicates that sentence 
judgments in Jacoby's experiment were made on the basis of the actual 
physical presence or absence of the modifying words. It is obvious, 
hmvever, that people do not remember exactly what they hear or see. 
(Sachs, 1967; Begg, 1971) 
Therefore, the present experiment addresses itself to two basic 
issues. First, is it possible to adequately assess the frequency with 
which the semantic content of a sentence has been expressed without 
(34) 
(35) 
reference to the actual words in which that idea has been stated? 
Second, if meaning or semantic content can be judged, wi II the spacings 
of meanings facilitate frequency j udgrnents of sernant i c content in a 
manner similar to the facilitation found by the spacing of vJords or 
intact sentences? In short, is it reasonable to speak of the frequency 
of sentence meaning? 
Specifically, the subjects in the present experiment were presented 
with a series of simple active declarative sentences in which a 
critical set were repeated in either an exact or a paraphrased form. 
Paraphrases were constructed by substituting synonyms for all content 
words. For example, 11 the huge pol iceman halted the expensive auto-
mobile 11 would be rephrased as 11 the large cop stopped the high-priced 
car . 11 Consensus that a sentence and its paraphrase did express the 
same content was obtained by asking a group of subjects to rate the 
degree of semantic similarity existing between a pair of sentences. 
Only those sentences which were judged to be highly similar were 
subsequently included in the experimental 1 ists. 
All subjects viewed the series of sentences under general memory 
instructions. Following study, however, groups of subjects were given 
different instructions regarding the type of frequency judgments which 
they were to make. In one condition, the subjects were asked to judge 
the number of times that a sentence had occurred during study in the 
exact form (i.e. same wording) shown on the test sheet. A second group 
of subjects was instructed to judge the frequency with which the 
particular meaning expressed by a test sentence had occurred regardless 
of the exact wording. In order to perform this task, the subjects 
must ignore the particular words comprising a sentence and focus on the 
semantic content. 
(36) 
Performance in this second condition is of importance in two 
specific respects. First, if the frequency judgments of meaninos can be 
reasonably accomplished, this will indicate that frequency can be 
reported on yet another dimension of the stir1ulus material. Jacoby 
(1972) has already demonstrated that the frequency of specifically-
worded sentences and the occurrences of nouns in different sentences 
can be derived from the same study presentations. Additionally, such 
a finding would be consistent with research indicating that semantic 
content is the primary component of long-term memory for sentences. 
Secondly, the role of the spacing of repetitions in the meaning 
judgment condition is a I so of importance in supporting a notion that 
frequency is derived on the basis of whatever dimensions are relevant 
for the type of judgments being requested. In Jacoby's (1972) experi-
ment, it was found that spacing was only effective for exact repetitions 
of experimental sentences. Any change in wording was sufficient to 
discriminate a similarly worded repetition from the original sentence 
and thus frequency judgments were not influenced by the simi Jar 
repetitions regardless of the level of spacing. In the present experi-
ment, hovvever, a difference in wording is not a relevant dimension for 
discriminating paraphrased sentences when meaning judgments are requested. 
It is expected that spacing wi II facilitate the judgments of frequency 
in the meaning judgment regardless of whether a sentence is repeated 
in an exact or paraphrased form. Spacing under these circumstances will 
always provide a relevant temporal cue for the determination of 
frequency. This finding would provide considerable support for a 
position maintainhg that frequency is derived on the basis of whatever 
dimensions are pertinent fo1· the task at hand. 
t1ETHOD 
Materials. Sixty sentences were employed during the actual 
experiment, each having a constant syntactical frame. Thirty-six of 
these sentences were essential to the experimental manipulations 
(critical sentences); 14 sentences served as filler items in the study 
lists (filler sentences); and 9 sentences were not seen until the time 
of test (neht sentences). For each critical sentence, a paraphrased 
version was constructed by substituting synonyms for all content words 
(i.e. adjectives, nouns, and verbs) while maintaining the same syntactic 
structure. Roget's Thesarus of the English Language and the Funk and 
Wagnall 's Standard Handbook~ Synonyms, Antonyms, an~ Prepositions were 
used in selecting synonyms. The 36 critical sentences and their 
paraphrases were selected from a larger set of synonomous pairs which had 
been rated by a group of 20 Ss for their degree of semantic similarity. 
A five-point scale was used for these ratings: 5-exactly the same in 
meaning; 4-very similar in meaning; 3-similar in meaning; 2-different in 
meaning; I-very different in meaning. A number of sentence pairs 
expressing divergent content were included in the to-be-rated set to 
ensure that the entire range of the scale would be employed by the ~s. 
Those 36 pairs receiving the highest ratings of semantic similarity were 
subsequently included in the experimental manipulations. No two sentences 
(i.e. critical sentences, their paraphrases, filler sentences, or new 
sentences) had any content words in common. In order to control for the 
imagery value of the sentences, the 36 critical sentences (only the 
original version) were submitted to four independent judges for rating on 
(37) 
(38) 
concreteness. Again, a five-point scale was used: 5-very easy to 
imagine; l1-easy to imagine; 3-fairly difficult to imagine; 2-difficult 
to imagine; I-very difficult to imagine. The 36 sentences were then 
grouped into 3 sets of 12 sentences for control purposes in the study 
lists; representing high, medium and lov..r levels of concreteness. 
Desiqn and Procedure. Visual presentation of the sentences was 
----·- -- ---· 
used. Each subject received a deck of 3X5 inch cards with one sentence 
typed per card. Prior to study, all Ss were given the follovJing 
instructions: 
This experiment is concerned with your memory 
for sentences. During the series of sentences 
which you will be asked to study, some of the 
sentences will be repeated and some of the 
sentences will have very similar meanings. 
The Ss were then paced through their deck of cards at a rate of 
7 seconds per card. Within a study deck, the frequency with which the 
critical sentences were presented was varied. There were 18-once-
presented (lP) and 18 twice-presented (2P) sentences. Regarding the 
2P sentences, two additional factors were manipulated: the type of 
senter~ce repetition (identical or paraphrased) and the number of other 
sentences interveningbetween the repetitions of a 2P sentence (spacing 
of 0, 4 and 8 sentences). Combination of these factors resu 1 ted in 
6 types of 2P sentences. There were three ins lances of each type 
within a study deck. Additionally, a number of sentences were repeated 
three times in order to increase the Ss 1 range of possible responses. 
Following study, the Ss were presented with test sheets of 
sentences. Testing instructions were varied between subjects. 
One-half of the Ss received instructions which stressed that frequency 
·judgments of the sentences were to be made only on the basis of the 
specific wording of the test sentences (Condition JOW). 
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The instructions vJere as follows: 
Tl>e sheets ~vh i ch have been honded-out to you 
contain a 1 ist of sentences. Some of these 
sentences were included in the deck of cards 
which you have just studied; others you have 
not seen. You are asked to judge the number 
of times which you saw each of the sentences 
during study. Your judgments may range from 
0 to 3. Be sure to judqe only the number of 
times that you have seen the sentence exactly 
as it is worded on the test sheets given to 
you. 
The other one-ha 1 f of the Ss received a second set of instructions 
\'Jh i ch emphasized that the frequency judgments be made on the basis 
of the content or meaning of the sentences. (Condition JOM) 
These instructions were stated in the following manner. 
The sheets which have been handed-out to you 
contain a 1 ist of sentences. Some of these 
sentences were included in the deck of cards 
which you have just studied; others you have 
not seen. You are asked to judge the number 
of times that the idea or meaning expressed 
in each sentence occurred in the study deck 
regardless of the exact manner in which it 
was worded. Your judgments may range from 
0 to 3. Remember that your judgments are to 
be made on the idea or meaning of the sen-
tence and not on the exact wording. 
(39) 
Examples of appropriate frequency judgment procedures for the two tasks 
were given to the respective instructional groups. 
TvJO control groups were included in which the study decks were 
unmixed with respect to the repetitions of the 2P sentences. In one 
control group, the repetitions of the 2P sentences were always 
identical in form and JOW instructions were given. In the second 
control group, the repetitions of the 2P sentences were always 
paraphrased and JOM instructions were given. The study and test 
instructions given to the control groups were slightly modified 
(i.e. the first control group wcJs not told to expect different 
sentences with similar meanings etc.) and the spacir1g of repetitions 
v!iJS v<:~ried in both control groups. 
Study_ Dec~.: /'>.study deck consisted of 79 card presentations. 
A primacy and recency buffer, respectively, occupied ordinal positions 
to 8 and 72 to 79. v/ithin each buffer, there 1r1ere three lP sentences, 
one 2P sentence, and one 3P sentence (the 2P and 3P sentences \·Jet·e 
repeated in identical form). The buffers were constant across all study 
decks. The central portion of a study deck \vas divided into three 
blocks of 21 sentences. Each block was composed of six lP sentences, 
six 2P sentences (representing a 11 six of the 2P sentence types), and 
a 3P filler sentence which was repeated in an identical form. Within a 
block, two of the lP sentences represented each of the three levels of 
concreteness. There was one sentence from each level of concreteness 
vJithin the three instances of a given 2P sentence type. Additionally, 
the six 2P sentences in a given block were equally divided among the 
three concreteness levels. Each block followed a completely different 
order of sentence-type presentations. 
The 36 critical sentences functioned as both lP sentences and as 
the six 2P sentence types during the course of the experiment. This 
necessitated that 12 different study decks be formed. Eighteen critical 
sentences first served as lP sentences while the other 18 served as 
2P sentences. Groups of three 2P sentences were then systematically 
rotated through the six 2P sentence types producing six different 
decks. The designation of lP and 2P sentences was then reversed and 
the same procedure was followed with six more decks resulting. While 
the position of the sentence types within a block remained constant 
throughout the experiment, the blocks, themselves, were rearranged in 
three different manners (i.e. B-1, B-2, B-3; B-3, B-1, B-2, and B-2, B-3, 
B-1). The position of sentence types in the study decks was partially 
( 41 ) 
controlled by presenting four of the different study decks under these 
three block or-ders. 
The study decks for the control conditions were similar in that 
the buffers, the filler items, and the division of the central portion 
of the deck into blocks were maintained. In the case of 2P sentences, 
there were two instances of each spacing level vJithin a given block of 
sentences. Tvvo critical sentences from each level of concreteness were 
included among the six 2P sentences in a block. Six different study 
decks were needed for each critical sentence to serve in all of the 
sentence types (lP sentences and three spacings of 2P sentences). These 
decks were formed by rotating groups of six critical sentences through 
the different sentence types via the procedures described above. 
Again, the position of the sentence types was partially controlled by 
rearranging the block orders in three different manners. Two study decks 
were studied under each of the three different orders. 
Test Booklets. The booklets were composed of three sheets of 
paper with 16 sentences typed per sheet. Each page included six lP 
sentences, six 2P sentences, one 3P filler sentence taken from the 
central portion of the study decks, and three new sentences. Two 
sentences fromeach level of concreteness were included among the six 
l P sentences on a page. In addition, all six types of 2P sentences 
were found on a given page. In the control conditions, two instances 
of each 2P type were found per page. Order of test i terns v1as 
randomized on each sheet of the test booklet. Paraphrased 2P sentences 
were always· tested by presenting the arbitrarily designated original 
critical sentence during test. 
Subjects. A total of 128 introductory psychology students at 
Loyola University served as Ss. Participation partially fulfilled a 
coLn·se requi rerncnt. Twenty Ss served in the initial rating procedure. 
The remaining 108 Ss were randomly assigned upon anivnl nt the I 
experimental room to one of the between Ss 1 treatment or control 
groups. In the experimental conditions, the treatment groups were 
formed by combining the two types of test instructions (JOW and JOM) 
v;ith the 12 different study decks. In the control conditions, the 
groups were formed by combining the two test instructions with the 
six study decks. Ss were tested in groups of three under the same 
ueatment conditions. Thus, 36 Ss served in each experimental 
instruction condition and 18 Ss served in each control instruction 
condition. 
RESULTS 
Hixed List Conditions 
An initial three-woy analysis of variance (Instructions X 
Type of Item X Sentence Concreteness) indicated that the concreteness 
1 eve 1 of the sentences produced no main effect and did not enter into 
any interactions with other experimental variables. Therefore, the 
mean judged frequency for once-presented (lP), twice-presented (2P-S), 
and paraphrased items (2P-P) in the tv·JO instructional conditions (JOW 
and JOM) have been collapsed over the levels of concreteness and are 
shown in Table 1. The means indicate that ~ displayed differential 
performance depending upon the type of test instructions which they 
received. When frequency judgments were requested for the exact wording 
of the sentences, the 2P-P i terns were judged in a manner simi 1 a r to the 
judgments made on the 1 P i terns. A 1 ternat i ve 1 y, the 2P-P i terns were 
judged like 2P-S items when Ss were asked to make frequency estimates 
on the basis of the general meaning expressed by the sentences. 
This description of performance was statistically analyzed by a 
series of orthogonal planned comparisons performed on the simple effects 
of Item Type (lP, 2P-S, 2P-P) in the two instructional groups. For Ss 
making judgments of sentence wording, the judged frequency of lP and 
2P-P items did not differ significantly, but the weighted comparison 
between lP and 2P-P items vs. 2P-S items was highly significant, F(l, 70) 
= 194.48, £<·001. Two planned comparisons were also performed for 
condition JOM. The first comparison indicated that mean judged frequency 
for 2P-S and 2P-P items did not differ significantly while the second 
comparison found that the judged frequency of lP items was significantly 
TABlE 1 
IV~ean Frequency Judgrnents in 
Mixed list Conditions 
TYPE OF ITEIVi 
TEST 
1P 2P-P 2P-S 
-
zasau aa~ 
JOW .8 4 4 .9 2 4 1.4 8 1 
lilil':illllli.~; 
1 nn,r. l -1.0 0 0 .. .... ..,. ""' I .. 0 ~ ,.. uVt I I 1.1"-0 j 1.0.:>0 J 
(It:> ) 
different from frequency judgment performance for the 2P- S and 2P- P 
items, .£(2, 70) == 226.lf3, p_(.OOl. In sum, the ~s \-Jere quite capable 
of performing two types of frequency judgment tasks following study 
under i dent i ca 1 conditions. 
One additional point, however, needs to be made regarding the 
means shown in Tab 1 e 1. The Ss tested under JOM instructions tended to 
produce generally higher estimates of frequency than Ss tested under 
JOW instructions. This observation is true for lP and 2P-S items where 
the two test instructions under optimal performance should both lead 
to the same frequencyestimates. Comparison of the means in the first 
and third columns of Table 1 makes this tendency clear. Simple effects 
analyses for Instructions statistically confirm the higher frequency 
judgments in the JOM condition for both the lP items, £..(1, 70) = 31.16, 
E.. (.001 and the 2P-S items, f..(l, 70) = 4.27, .e_(.Ol. 
The tendency for higher frequency estimates in Condition JOM 
is also reflected in ~s 1 performance on sentences presented only at the 
time of test (not-presented or NP items). The false-alarm rates 
(i.e. the proportion of total responses to NP sentences that were 1 or 
greater) were 12.6% for Condition JOM and 5.8% for Condition JOW. The 
corresponding mean judged frequencies were . 19 in Condition JOM and .06 
in Condition JOW. However, !_-test performed on mean frequency judgments 
for NP items failed to reach statistical significance. 
In order to assess the role of the spacing of item repetitions, 
frequency estimates for the 2P-S and 2P-P sentences were further 
analyzed in a 2 X 2 X 3 X 3 analysis of variance (Instruction X 
Type of Repetition X Sentence Concreteness X Spacing of Repetitions). 
This analysis produced significant main effects for Instructions 
(JO\>J or JOM), f_(l, 70 = fi3.70, for the Type of Repetition 
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FIGURE 1. Frequency Judgment Performance For 2P-S and 2P-P 
Sentences in the Mixed List Conditions. 
(4 7) 
Unmixed List Conditions 
In the unmixed list conditions, the Concreteness of the study 
sentences agoin entered into no significant sources of va1·iation 
in any of the <1na lyses performed. Therefore, no further mention 
of this variable v;i 11 be 1n3de. Frequency judgment perfo1·mance in the 
JOW and JOM condition was analyzed separately. In both conditions, 
Frequency of Presentation (lP and 2P) produced a significant main effect; 
for Condition JOW, ~(1, 17) == 76.84 and for Condition JOM, ~(1, 17) = 
1117.75 (both E_1s( .001). 
Performance on the NP sentences was quite comparable in the two 
instructional groups. The false-alarm rates were 5.5% for Condition 
JOW and 4% for Condition JOM. A .!_-test performed on the mean judged 
frequencies for NP items proved nonsignificant, l(70) = 1.74, £. (. 10. 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean frequency judgments made by the 
instructional groups for lP and 2P items at each of three levels at which 
sentences repetitionswere spaced (0, 4 and 8). It should be remembered 
that twice-presented items in Condition JOW were repeated in the same 
form (2~5) while the twice-presented items in Condition JOM consisted 
of an original sentence followed by a paraphrased version (2P-P). The 
two unmixed 1 ist conditions were comparable, however, in terms of the 
number of lP and 2P (either 2P-S or 2P-P) items in the study lists. 
Inspection of Figure 2 shows that frequency judgments in Condition JOW 
increased from 0 spacing to 4 spacing and then remained relatively un-
changed at spacing level 8. In Condition JOM, however, judged frequency 
first increased and then decreased across the different spacing levels. 
The amount of increase from 0 spacing to 4 spacing was considerably 
larger in Condition JOW than in Condition JOM (l .35 to 1.94 for Condition 
J0\<1 vs. 1. 72 to 1. 85 for Condition J01'1). 
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FIGURE 2. Frequency Judgment Performance in the Unmixed Lists. 
(Same or Paraphrosed), F(l, 70) = 70.7.8, and for the Spacing of 
Repetitions (0, l-1, or 8), :_(2, 140) = 17.86 (all .e_'s (.001). Addition-
ally, a siqnificant lr~truction by Repetition Type interaction, :_(1, 70) 
31.38 and a significant Repetition Type by Spacing interaction, [(2,140) 
46.58, v1ere found (both E.'s (. 00 I). 
The Instruction by Repetition Type interaction can be attributed 
to the differential performance displayed in the two instructional 
groups for 2P-P sentences. The nature of the interaction can be seen 
in Table 1. The 2P-P sentences were treated as lP items in Condition 
JO\.J and as 2P-S items in Condition JOM. 
Figure 1 shows the mean judged frequency for the two repetition 
types (2P-S and 2P-P) at the different levels of spacing in both 
Condition ~Wand JOM. The Repetition Type by Spacing interaction is 
ref] ected in the fact that 2P-S sentences resu 1 ted in higher frequency 
judgments at the longer lags in both instructional conditions, while 
the 2P-P sentences showed no effect due to spacing in either Condition 
JOW or JOM. This observation is true a 1 though the 2P-P sentences were 
judged as IP sentences in Condition JOW and as 2P-S sentences in 
Condition JOM. The three-way interaction of Instructions X Repetition 
Type X Spacing was not significant. 
Simple effects of Spacing for the 2P-S items collapsed over 
instruction groups indicates significant variation due to the level of 
spacing, [{2, 140) = 39.57, .e_ (.001. Newman-Keuls tests performed on the 
means for each spacing level indicate that levels 4 and 8 are sig-
nificantly higher than the 0 level but do not differ between themselves 
(significant .e_'s< .05). The simple effects analysis for spacing showed 
no significant effect on the performance for 2P-P sentences \>Jhere the 
second occurrence of an item was a synonomous version of the first 
occurrence. 
l 
l 
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Statistical confirmation of this description of Figure 2 is 
provided by two 3 X 3 (Spacing X Concreteness) within-subject analyses 
of variance. The analysis performed for Condition JOW produced a 
significant main effect due to the level of spacing, ~(2, 3~) = 13.50, 
Individual comparisons among the means at each spacing level 
were conducted using the Newman-Keuls procedure. It was found that the 
judged frequency at spacing levels~ and 8 did not differ significantly 
but was substantially higher than the judged frequency at the 0 spacing 
level (significant p_1 s(.05). For Condition JOM, no significant 
variation in the frequency judgments could be attributed to the in-
f 1 uence of spacing. 
DISCUSSION 
The pattern of results obtained in the present experiment 
provide t\vo significant findings regarding frequency judgment 
performance with sentence material. First, it has been shown that 
reliable frequency information can be reported along the dimensions 
of either the exact wordings or the basic 11gists 11 of study sentences. 
Second, frequency estimates for paraphrased sentences in Condition JOM 
demonstrates a situation in which the facilitative effects of distributed 
repetitions fails to occur although the two synonomous sentences are 
~vidently viewed in conjunction by those Ss making judgments of sen-
tence meaning. 
In the present study, the Ss were given sentences for study but 
were not told until the time of test what the nature of the impending 
test would be. Performance by ~s in the JOM condition clearly indicates 
that the frequency of some abstract representation of sentence 1 s 
meaning can be assessed even when the manner of phrasing the meaning 
varies markedly at each occurrence. In this experiment, two synonomous 
versions of the same basic meaning were properly seen as a twice-
occurring event when ~s were told to make their frequency judgments on 
, I 
I the basis of the study sentences underlying meaning without regard to 
the specific wording. On the other hand, Ss in Condition JO\o/ were quite 
capable of discriminating twice-presented (2P-S) and paraphrased (2P-P) 
sentences when the test instructions placed emphasis on the judgment of 
a sentence 1 s exact wording. Under these conditions, the paraph rased 
items were treated in a manner similar to once-presented sentences. 
These results would necessitate that an index for a sentence 1 s 
(51 ) 
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exact wording and an ind~x for some abstract representation of the 
sentence's meaning ivould have to be maintained if frequency information 
is directly encoded into memory as is asserted by Underwood (1969). In 
short, the Ss must necessarily perform a summing operation along tvm 
dimensions of the study sentences (i.e. the wordings and the meanings). 
That such operations might be carried out does not seem unreasonable 
for the Ss were told prior to study that some sentences would be re-
peated in identical form while in other cases two different sentences 
ivould be similar in meaning. The tvm salient dimensions of the sentence 
material, therefore, were made relatively clear. 
The spacing of sentence repetitions has resulted in consistent 
findings in the mixed and unmixed 1 ist conditions of the present study. 
When the study sentences were repeated in identical form, frequency 
judgments much more c I ose I y approximated the actual presented frequency 
when the two occurrences of the sentence:, were sepat a led by el the( 4 
or 8 intervening items than if the two repetitions came in immediate 
succession. This facilitative effect of spacing for 2P-S sentences was 
observed in Conditions JOW and JOM for both mixed and unmixed study 
lists. It should be noted that a normal "spacing effect" implies that 
frequency judgments should become progressively higher as the lag 
between the two repetitions becomes larger. In the present study, 
frequency judgments for 2P-S items did not increase beyond the 4 level of 
spacing. However, it may be suggested that a "ceiling" level was 
reached at spacing level 4 due to the restricted range of possible 
responses available in this experiment. 
For the paraphrased sentences, no spacing effect was found; 
even in Condition JOM where the 2P-P items were treated as twice-
occurring events. In the unmixed 1 ist conditions, the Ss making 
I 
I 
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judQments of sentence meaning did nppear to be influenced to some 
extent by the lag between the tvm synonomous sentences. It rnay be 
noted that frequency judgments did increase from the 0 to 4 levels 
of spacing. Hm·1ever, the frequency judgments for paraphrased sentences 
at spacing level 8 dropped below the performance shown at the 0 level 
and none of the differences among the lags were found to be significant. 
In mixed list conditions, judged frequency for paraphrased sentences was 
virtually identical at the three levels of spacing in Condition JOM. 
These results indicate that the lag between paraphrased sentences 
played little or no role in the frequency judgments made on this type of 
study item. 
One additional aspect of the present results warrants some inter-
pretation. While the findings of this experiment clearly indicate that 
both the wording and the meaning of study sentences can be adequately 
assessed, the question may st i 11 be raised as to whether or not the 
judgment of meaning and the judgment of wording tasks are of equal 
difficulty. Studies such as those conducted by Sachs (1967) and Begg 
(1970) would suggest that general meaning as opposed to the exact 
wording of sentences would more likely be remembered. In terms of the 
present experiment, such findings would imply that the judgments of 
sentence meaning should more closely approximate the actual presented 
frequency of meanings than the judgments of sentence wording should 
approximate the actual occurrence of specifically worded sentences. 
In the mixed I ist conditions of this study, the JOM instructions 
did, in fact, tend to produce generally higher frequency judgments 
than Condition JOW. This tendency is reflected in the mean frequency 
judgments for NP, lP, and 2P-S sentences where the two instructions 
l under optimal performance would result in the same judgments. In terms 
L 
(5h) 
of the ''surnned'' or encoded view of frequency, this finding vJOuld imply 
that the Ss employed different criteria in r·cporting their- stored 
frequency information depending upon the test requirements. These 
observations, however, must be interpreted with caution because the 
overall means for once-presented (1.09) and twice-presented (1.73) 
sentences were identical for the JOM and JOW conditions in the unmixed 
1 is ts. 
The higher frequency judgments for the JOM condition in the 
mixed lists might be more parsimoniously explained in terms of differen-
tial response biases in the two instructional conditions which were 
built into the experimental design. In the JOW condition, the task 
l demands required that three-fourths of the experimental sentences be ca 11 ed once-occurring wh i 1 e the demands for appropriate performance in 
I 
l 
the JOM condition specified that only one-half of the experimental 
sentences be judged as once-presented. These differences in response 
probabilities were not present in the unmixed lists. 
In order to test this possible explanation for the higher 
frequency judgments in Condition JOM, a testing effects analysis was 
conducted for the frequency judgments made in the mixed 1 ist conditions. 
This analysis considered the frequency judgments for the different 
types of items (lP, 2P-S, and 2P-P) in the two instruction groups 
according to whether they occurred in the first, second or third portion 
of the test list. Thus, the position in the test list at which the 
sentences were presented was taken into account. If the response bias 
described above were actually operating, it would be expected that the 
judgments in Condition JOM should become higher in each third of the 
list and the judgments in Condition JO\.J l01ver in each portion of the 
test 1 ist as the differential response probabilities became apparent 
(55) 
to the Ss. 
The testing effects analysis, however, found no main effect for 
position nor any interaction of position with either the instruction 
groups or the type of item. Therefore, the results of this experiment 
are in agreement with the finding of Sachs (1967) and Begg (1971) that 
the meaning rather than the wording of sentences is the more likely 
display of memory for sentence material. The failure to find an 
overall difference in frequency judgments between Conditions JOW and 
JOM in the unmixed lists may be attributed to the fact that in these 
conditions, the ~s were presented with only one type of repetition 
in the study lists. As compared to the mixed list conditions where 
both types of repetitions were presented, performance with the unmixed 
lists most probably constituted an easier task in which frequency 
information would only be summed or encoded along one dimension 
(i.e. wording or meaning) of the study sentences. 
While the results of the present experiment have been considered 
in light of an encoded view of frequency, Jacoby (1972) has suggested 
an alternative position regarding frequency information. In his study, 
I 
sentences were also presented for study under neutral instructions. 
At the time of test, Jacoby's ~s were asked to judge either the 
~ frequency of the intact sentences or the frequency of subject-nouns 
j 
contained in the sentences. In some cases, the subject-nouns were 
repeated in identical sentence frames, while in other cases, subject-
nouns were repeated in different sentence frames. Like the present 
experiment, Jacoby (1972) discovered that ~s were fairly accurate in 
reporting frequency information on both dimensions (i.e. sentences and 
nouns). In interpreting this finding, Jacoby maintained that frequency 
information is not directly entered into memory but is rather derived 
I 
I' 
I ~ 
I 
at the ti111e of test on the basis of contextu<3l inform<:Jtion. Context 
(56) 
for Jacoby can be classified as of tvJO basic types; temporal context 
referring to the point in the study list at which a given event 
occurred and semantic context referring to either the sentences immediately 
preceding and fol lm·Jing a given sentence or to the sentence frame in 
which a given subject-noun occurred. 
Jacoby (1972) maintained that the occurrences of both sentences 
and nouns result in independent traces as the Hintzman and Block (1971) 
multiple-trace hypothesis would suggest and that further, the different 
occurrences of an item result in traces which are in some way marked 
for both the temporal and semantic context in which they occurred. 
At the time of test, aS would then retrieve the different traces 
requested by task instructions. The extent to which the independent 
traces of a given event overlapped in contextual features would then 
dictate a S's success in estimating frequency along different dimensions 
of the study material (either nouns or sentences in the Jacoby study). 
Howe (1973) has provided a more detailed analysis of the derived view 
l 
I of frequency based on contextual feature tagging. 
While context undoubtedly may influence frequency judgment 
performance such as that found in the Jacoby study, it does not 
seem reasonable to deny that a S wi 11 ever sum events of different 
types during study. Jacoby (1972) has argued that the encoded view of 
frequency would necessitate that frequency information in his study 
must be stored for each sentence and additionally, for each word found 
in the sentences regardless of the particular sentence frames in which 
they occurred. His conclusion was that such an analysis of frequency 
information would "soon become unwieldy." Nonetheless, it is possible 
that Ss may sum frequency along a number of particularly salient 
L 
II! I 
ii 
I ' 
i ! 
1.
,, 
,:!: 
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I 
(57) 
dimensions of the study material os has been suggested for the findings 
of the present experiment. Subject-nouns along with the intact sen-
tence units appear to be likely candidates for the salient dimensions 
in the Jacoby (1972) study. It is unlikely that the Ss in the Jacoby 
experiment would have been so successful in reporting the frequency of 
less essential words found in the sentences such as adjectives or 
articles. The position taken here is that frequency may be summed 
(and thus encoded) along a number of salient dimensions found in 
study material and necessarily derived along any other dimensions which 
a~ does not view as salient during study. The number of salient 
dimensions along which frequencies can be summed at any one time remains 
a question for future investigation. 
Jacoby (1972) has also considered the role of spacing in 
frequency judgment processes. Basi call y, Jacoby discovered that 
spacing effects were markedly apparent when the to-be-judged events 
were repeated in identical fashion (i.e. the intact sentences and subject-
nouns repeated in the same sentence frames) and considerably reduced 
when the context of the to-be-judged events varied at each repetition 
(i.e. subject~ouns repeated in different sentence frames). These results 
are, of course, not unlike the influence of spacing found in the present 
research; clear spacing effects were only present for those sentences 
repeated in identical fashion. The role of spacing must then be con-
sidered in light of the encoded and derived views of frequency 
information. 
Under the derived point-of-view, frequency estimates depend upon 
aS's ability to retrieve the independent traces associated with the 
the repetitions of a given item, and the various traces are more 
readily retrievable if they are readily discriminable. 
~i 
I 
I 
(58) 
According to Jacoby (1972), discriminabil ity depends upon the number 
of cont~xtual features which the different traces for a repeated event 
have in common. Therefore, the derived view of frequency would explain 
the "spacing effect 11 by asserting that 'the distribution of repetitions 
in a study list vwuld provide the different occurrences of an item with 
considerably more distinct contextual environments than would be the 
case if the repetitbns occurred in a successive fashion. Lower 
frequency judgments for items at a 0 spacing level can then be inter-
preted as a failure to discriminate the independent traces of a 
repeated event on the basis of their contextual features. The derived 
point-of-view could also explain the lack of spacing effects for 
paraphrased sentences in the present study if the exact wordings of 
study sentences could be viewed as the semantic context in \>Jhich the 
abstract representations of sentence meaning occurred. Context would 
then make the two occurrences of a paraphrased sentence readily dis-
criminable no matter how widely the two synonomous sentences were 
dispersed in a study list. Again, Howe (1973) provides a more detailed 
analysis of such processes. 
The "encoded" view of frequency suggested in the discussion of 
present findings, alternatively, maintains that frequency information 
is directly entered into memory as a ~sums stimulus events along 
different dimensions of the study material. The encoded position does 
not rely on the discriminability and retrievability of contextual inform-
ation at the time of test and therefore, different explanations must be 
sought for the presence of spacing effects in judgments of twice-
presented (2P-S) sentences and the absence of spacing effects in 
judgments of paraphrased (2P-P) sentences in the pr·esent study. 
Such explanations may be found if it can be assumed that lower 
(59) 
frequency judgments under massed conditions of presentation are due 
to a failure to adequately encode the :;econd presentation of an item 
rather than to a failure to distinguish bet~veen ti·JO adequately encoded 
traces. Hintzman (1974) has recently reviewed several theories of the 
spacing effect; two of which interpret the relatively poor performance 
with massed items as a failure to properly encode the second presenta-
tion. These theories have been labelled the "attention hypothesis" 
and the "habituation hypothesis.'' 
The attention hypothesis, on the one hand, assumes that the 
inefficient storage of the second occurrence of a massed item is due to 
a voluntary process on the part of the subject. Very basically, the 
hypothesis states that during the second presentation of a massed item, 
a subject simply ceases processing of the item and rests or redirects 
his attention to the processing of other items in the study list. The 
reason that a subject would undertake either of these two activities 
is presumably because he believes that he has sufficiently encoded the 
item during the first occurrence. 
The habituation hypothesis, alternatively, views the inefficient 
encoding of the second occurrence of an item as due to some underlying 
process over which the subject has no control. Hintzman (1974) has 
likened the notion of habituation to a psychological refractory period 
during the threshold "for the response of storing a particular kind of 
memory trace" (p. 21) is raised. Habituation, under this view, will 
occur regardless of the subject's level of attention. Either hypothesis 
potentially provides the encoded view of frequency with an explanation 
as to why massed repetitions of items ltJould be less efficiently summed 
than distributed repetitions of the i.tems. 
While the present study was not designed to specifically evaluate 
(60) 
these tvlO proposals, the findings can provide some insight into which of 
the two hypotheses would be more amenable to an explanation of spacing 
effects found in the judgment of sentence frequency. If the assumption 
can be made that an abstract representation of a sentence's meaning is 
stored in memory and also, that the synonomous versions of paraphrased 
items result in the same abstract representation, it appears that a 
situation has resulted in which a subject will not attenuate his 
attention for the second occurrence of a paraphrase<;! sentence. In the 
JOM condition, the subject•s task is to judge the underlying meanings 
of the sentences but because the underlying meaning of a sentence wi 11 
not become apparent unt i 1 the sentence has been decoded and compre-
hended, the subject will not alter his attention to paraphrased sen-
tences even when the two versions are presented in immediate succession. 
The altering of attention would, of course, be expected for sentences 
rep~ated in identical form. The failure to find a spacing effect for 
paraphrased items in Condition JOM provides some support for the attention 
hypothesis. 
If the habituation notion of spacing is to be accepted, the 
present findings suggest that it is the response of storing a rather 
true copy of the sentence which habituates in the processing of sen-
tence material. The failure to find a spacing effect for paraphrased 
sentences in the JOM condition seems to indicate that the storage of the 
abstract representation of a sentence 1 s meaning is not susceptible to 
the habituation process. 
Summary 
Subjects in the present experiment succeeded in judging the 
frequency of either the exact >-Jording or the underlying meaning of study 
sentences. Frequency estimates for paraphrased sentences clearly 
( 61 ) 
indicated that subjects could focus on either surface properties of the 
two synonomous sentences or on the underlying "gist" of the two sen-
tences dependIng upon the task demunds. Because these task demands 
1vere not specIfIed unt I 1 after the sentences had been presented for 
study, it has been argued that frequency information can be summed 
simultaneously on a number of salient dimensions found in the sentence 
material. The occ~rence and nonoccurrence of spacing effects in 
different conditions of the present study have been considered in 
light of an attention and a habituation hypothesis. The findings of 
this experiment seem more amenable to an attention explanation. If a 
habituation process is occurring, it appears that the response of 
storing an exact representation of a sentence is decremented rather 
than the response of storing an abstract trace of the sentence 1 s meaning. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sentence Material Used in the t1ixed and Unmixed Lists 
Experimental sentences presented during study: 
the original sentences and their paraphrases. 
Mean Concreteness ratings are indicated in parentheses. 
High Concreteness Sentences 
The impenetrabb barricade obstructed the primary road. 
The impassable barrier blocked the main highway. (4.25) 
The absent-minded attorney mishandled the critical 
The forgetful lawyer bungled the important trial. 
case. 
( 4. 50) 
The pushy journalist questioned the dishonest politician. 
The aggressive reporter quizzed the corrupt official. (4.25) 
The frugal tourists rested in a spotless hotel. 
The thrifty travelers relaxed in an immaculate inn. (4.75) 
The novice skydiver came dovm on the solid earth. 
The amateur parachutist landed on the hard ground. (4.25) 
The murky fluid spoiled the clear stream. 
The dark liquid ruined the unpolluted creek. (4.25) 
The curious researcher investigated an appealing subject. 
The inquisitive experimenter studied an interesting topic. (4.50) 
A permanent stain tarnished the plush carpet. 
An indelible blot discolored the thick rug. (4.75) 
The famished flock drank from the quiet pond. 
The starving herd watered at the calm pool. (4.25) 
The large pol iceman stopped the expensive automobile. 
The huge cop halted the high-priced car. (4.25) 
The brave horsemen carried brilliant banners. 
The courageous cavalry bore brightly-colored flags. (4.50) 
The intoxicated tramp staggered into the grimy tavern. 
The drunken bum stumbled into the dingy bar. (4.75) 
(67) 
t1c:d i urn Cone re l enes s Sen tenccs 
The angry soldier fired the deadly pistol. 
The irritated G. I. shot the dangerous revolver. (3.75) 
The communitycitizens arranged the yearly feast. 
The local residents organized the annual banquet. (3.75) 
The muscular boxer registered a brutal punch. 
The burly fighter dealt a crushing blow. (3.50) 
The nosey foreman observed the employee 1 s actions. 
The snoopy supervisor watched the worker 1 s behavior. (3.50) 
The cunning robbers stole the precious timepiece. 
The clever bandits swiped the invaluable clock. (3.75) 
The feared sickness swept the 1 ittle village. 
The small town was ravaged by the dreaded disease. (3.75) 
The tired army defeated the hated enemy. 
The weary troops conquered the despised foes. (3.50) 
The cranky spinster slipped on the slick pavement. 
The crabby old-maid fell on the slippery sidewalk. {l1.00) 
The repulsive creatures crawled through the spooky cemetery. 
The ugly monsters crept through the eerie graveyard. (3.50) 
The popular combo played a unique tune. 
The well-liked band performed an unusual number. (3.50) 
The bold explorers traversed the desolate prairie. 
The adventurous pioneers crossed the barren plain. (3.50) 
An unexpected disaster ended the exhausting journey. 
A sudden accident concluded the fatiguing trip. (3.50) 
Low Concreteness Sentences 
The controversial proposal caused a heated argument. 
The debatable suggestion produced a violent dispute. (2.00) 
The upper class ruled over the common folk. 
The elite caste reigned over the plain people. (3.00) 
The unsightly rubbish filled the empty street. 
The unattractive trash covered the vacant avenue. (3.25) 
The scanty salary enraged the straiqhtforward assistants. 
The meager pay cnfuriated the outsp~ken assistants. (2.25) 
(68) 
--
lhe wretched junkie longed for the prohibited dope. 
The depraved addict craved the i !legal drugs. (2.00) 
(69) 
The \-Jinning team appeared to be an unbelievable long-shot. 
The triumphant club seemed to be an incr-edible dark-horse. (3.25) 
A pungent odor f i 11 ed the intire home. 
An unpleasant smell permeated the v,rhole house. (2.75) 
The good··looking lady was deceived by the handsome lad. 
The pretty woman was tricked by the attractive boy. (3.00) 
The famed singer released a wonderful album. 
The noted vocalist put out a fine record. (3.00) 
The growing business showed a sizable profit. 
The prospering company displayed a considerable gain. (3.00) 
The apprehensive pupil wanted a good schooling. 
The anxious student desired a sound education. (2. 00) 
The loyal typist defended her distinguished boss. 
The faithful stenographer protected her respected employer. (3.00) 
Sentences Presented in the Primacy and Recency Buffers 
of the Study Lists. 
Once-presented Buffer Sentences 
The wholesome cafe served good food. 
The displeased executive pardoned his aloof colleague. 
The s 1 i my frogs 1 i ved in the dreary swamps. 
The imaginative artist stared at the shapely model. 
An unshakeable faith in God fortifies religious people. 
The decrepit docks could only accomodate a feq boats. 
Twice-presented Buffer Sentences. 
A rock edifice marked the remote boundary. 
A stone monument signified the outmost border. 
The sh r i 11 sound upset the contented chickens. 
The piercing noise alarmed the satisfied hens. 
Buffer Sentences Presented Three Times. 
The cheerful child picked the lovely blossoms. 
The happy youngster plucked the beautiful petals. 
The gleeful tot gathered the gorgeous flowers. 
The skilled physician bandaged the painful wound. 
The proficient surgeon covered the throbbing injury. 
The expert doc tal- vn-apped the aching sore. 
Filler Sentences Presented Three Times 
in the Study and Test Lists. 
The wild tyrant persecuted the radical sect. 
The crue 1 ru 1 er suppressed the dissenting facti on. 
The hot-blooded dictator oppressed the revolutionary party. 
A strong breeze heartened the sturdy sal lors. 
A vigorous gale perked up the rugged boatmen. 
A brisk wind gladened the hardy seafarers. 
An unexpected disaster ended the exhausting journey. 
A sudden accident concluded the fatiguing trip. 
An unforeseen tradegy interupted the tiring voyage. 
Sentences Presented Only at the Time of Test. 
ThP devout minister co11nseled the parishoners, 
The penni less serfs reaped the autumn harvest. 
The tan thoroughbred galloped the circular course. 
The disorderly mob left the bust] ing station. 
The modern slang astounded the scholarly instructors. 
The vain bookkeeper purchased a fashionable wig. 
The crude laborer gulped the icy beverage. 
The insane moron hurt the tiny dog. 
The secret agent received a coded message. 
(70) 
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APPENDIX B 
Analysis of Variance Summary Tables 
Analysis of Variance for 2P-S and 2P-P Sentences in the Mixed Lists 
(Instructions X Subjects X Type of Repetition X Lag X Concreteness Level) 
Source 
BetvJeen Ss 
Instructions (I) 
Subjects w I 
Hithin Ss 
Type of Rep (T) 
Lag (L) 
Concreteness (C) 
IT 
IL 
TL 
iC 
TC 
LC 
ST w 
SL vJ 
sc \tJ 
ITL 
lTC 
ILC 
TLC 
STL w I 
STC w I 
SLC w I 
ITLC 
STLC w 
Total 
Sums of Squares 
38.371 
19.473 
1.061 
17.130 
.659 
14.826 
2.247 
1. 284 
1. 901 
38.218 
76.309 
66.133 
.863 
.914 
1. 142 
.290 
58.070 
72.569 
159.825 
. 142 
149.625 
1030.032 
~·d: denotes significance at the . 001 1 eve 1 
(72) 
df 
1 
70 
I 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
70 
Jl!O 
140 
2 
2 
4 
4 
140 
140 
280 
4 
280 
1295 
Mean Squares 
99.445 
1. 561 
38.371 
9.737 
. 531 
17.130 
.329 
7.413 
I. 123 
.642 
.475 
.546 
.545 
.472 
.431 
.457 
.285 
.072 
.415 
.518 
.570 
.035 
.534 
F 
70. 28o~·--·, 
17. 864~·--·, 
1. 124 
31 . 376;':.': 
17. 871 ~·,~·, 
2.3/8 
1. 238 
1 • Ol~O 
Ill 
(73) 
Testing Effects Analysis for lP, 2P-S, and 2P-P Sentences in the Mixed Lists 
(Instructions X Subjects X Type of Sentence X Position in Test List) 
Source 
BetvJeen Ss 
Instructions (!) 
Subjects w I 
Within Ss 
Type of Sen (T) 
Pos i t i on ( P) 
IT 
IP 
TP 
ST w I 
SP w I 
ITP 
STP w 
Total 
___ S_ums of So,uarc_s __ df 
22.842 
61 .892 
58.352 
.799 
8.594 
.924 
.671 
37.857 
35.394 
1 . 153 
64.351 
292.809 
1 
70 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
140 
140 
4 
280 
647 
**denotes significance at the .001 lRvel 
Mean Squar~---
22.842 
.884 
29.176 
.399 
4.297 
.462 
. 168 
.270 
.253 
.288 
.229 
107. 897•':>': 
1. 579 
15.890 
1 .828 
1. 254 
Analysis of Variance for lP and 2P Sentences in Condition JOW for Unmixed Lists 
(Type of Sentence X Concreteness Level X Subjects) 
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F 
Between Ss 7. 180 17 
Within Ss 
-----
Type of Sen (T) 14.208 1 14.208 76. 840•'d: 
Concreteness (c) . 141 2 .070 
TC . 146 2 .073 
T by Ss 3.143 17 . 185 
c by Ss 4.528 34 . 133 
TC by Ss 2.780 34 .082 
Total 32. 126 107 
.~,':denotes significance at the .001 level 
Ill 
(74) 
Analysis of Variance for 2P Sentences in Condition JO\.J of the Unmixed Lists 
(Lag X Concreteness Level X Subjects) 
Source Sums of Squares df ~1ean Squares F 
Between Ss 14.327 17 ______ ,_ 
Within Ss 
-
Lag (L) 10.892 2 5.446 13. 497~·~,·~ 
Concreteness (c) . 114 2 .057 
LC 3.265 4 .816 1.950 
L by Ss 13.719 34 .404 
c by Ss 13. 164 34 .387 
LC by Ss 28.456 68 .419 
Total 83.937 161 
;'~·k denotes significance at the .001 level 
Analysis of Variance for 1P and 2P Sentences in Condition JOM for Unmixed 
Lists (Type of Sentence X Concreteness Level X Subjects) 
Source Sums of Squares df Mean Squares F 
Between Ss 1.965 I 7 
Within Ss 
Type of Sen (T) 14. 199 1 14. 199 147. 753~b·~ 
Concreteness (C) .097 2 .049 
TC .084 2 .042 
T by Ss 1. 633 I 7 .096 
c by Ss 2.755 34 .081 
TC by Ss 1 . 176 34 .035 
Total 21.909 107 
~·n'~denotes significance at the .001 level 
(75) 
Analysis of Variance for 2P Sentences in Condition JOM of the Unmixed Lists 
(Lag X Concreteness Level X Subjects) 
Source 
Betvveen Ss 
\·Jithin Ss 
Lag (L) 
Concreteness (C) 
LC 
L by Ss 
C by Ss 
LC by Ss 
Total 
Sums of Squares 
1. 948 
.522 
.599 
10.552 
7.812 
19.985 
47.722 
9.f ______ Mea ~~ Sq uu._r_e_s ____ F __ 
17 
2 .974 3. 11+0 
2 .261 1.130 
4 . 150 
34 .310 
34 .230 
68 .294 
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